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Citizenship and constitutional law: an introduction 
 
Jo Shaw* 
 
1. Setting the scene: the goals of this collection 
The goal of this collection is to uncover the different ways in which constitutional 
law and citizenship intersect. Linking citizenship and constitutional law in this way 
can help to elucidate many of the foundational dilemmas of the modern state, as 
well as offering a deeper understanding of the condition of citizenship in the 
modern world. However, given the breadth of the field under review, the focus 
needs to be made a little more precise. So five key questions have been picked out 
for attention in the separate parts of this volume: 
 
 How does citizenship relate to the constitutional fundamentals of 
democracy and legitimacy, including the concepts of constituent power, 
patriotism and allegiance (Part I)? 
 What role does constitutional law play in the ‘making (and unmaking) of 
citizens’ both as a matter of general principle (Part II) and also specifically 
in certain national contexts (Part III); 
 How does the constitutional law/citizenship interface fare where there are 
plural sources of authority and legitimacy, and fragmented systems of 
governance for citizenship (Part IV)? 
 How does a prism of constitutionalism contribute to understanding better 
the contestation of the rights and duties of citizens and of citizenship (Part 
V)? 
 
The advantage of taking a constitutional approach is that it enables us to take a 
close look at the fundamentals of the legal status of citizenship, whilst exploring 
other aspects of citizenship which are not as effectively captured purely by a 
formal legal approach to membership, such as issues of identity and community. 
To put it another way, constitutions bring with them not only a rule-of-law 
perspective on the norms of citizenship, but also certain types of ‘baggage’ which 
help us to fill out the notion of citizenship, by providing the context and history 
which underpins the formal rules.1 Hence a ‘constitutional ethnographies’2 
approach to studying citizenship can be very fruitful, focusing on the lived details 
of citizenship regimes in constitutional settings. The point is not to highlight the 
                                                        
* Salvesen Chair of European Institutions at the University of Edinburgh. This introduction 
was written whilst I was holding a EURIAS Fellowship at the Helsinki Collegium of 
Advanced Studies, and the financial support of the EURIAS Programme and HCAS is 
acknowledged with thanks. I am grateful Rainer Bauböck for comments on a draft and to 
Maarten Vink for information about data on dual citizenship. 
1  C. Thornhill, ‘The Sociology of Constitutions’, (2017) 13 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 493–513. 
2  This term was initiated by Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Constitutional ethnography: an 
introduction’ (2004) 38 Law and Society Review 389–406, and it has been widely applied in 
constitutional studies, e.g. in relation to the study of citizenship in the former Yugoslavia: J. 
Shaw and I. Štiks, ‘Citizenship in the new states of South Eastern Europe’, (2012) 16 
Citizenship Studies 309-321. 
 2 
abstract characteristics of different systems,3 and perhaps to compare them using 
formal or quantitative methods of analysis in order to predict or explain processes 
of change, or similarities and differences.4 Rather it is to explore the themes that 
emerge when two dimensions such as ‘citizenship regimes’ and ‘constitutional law’ 
are put into conversation with each other by means of deeply contextual thick 
descriptions of many dimensions of the issue. It is this type of interdisciplinary 
approach that is predominant amongst the papers collected in this volume, 
although the various texts are rooted in many different disciplines within which 
scholars have explored the concept of citizenship, including law, political science, 
political theory, international relations and sociology. 
 
2. A brief note on terminology 
The topic of this collection is ‘citizenship’, but from time to time in various texts the 
concept of ‘nationality’ is referred to. There is considerable confusion about the 
relationship between these two terms, which are used sometimes synonymously 
and sometimes to designate quite different concepts or practices. There is also 
profound variation in precise usage across languages and cultures. So far as 
reference is made to the legal status held by individuals, recognised both within 
and across states by domestic law and international law, it is quite common and 
unproblematic to deploy the two terms as synonyms. However, in English it is 
clear that the two terms do have different roots (the ‘natione’ and the ‘civis’), and 
this is frequently the case also in other languages, including those without Latin or 
Greek foundations. This is clear from the EUDO Citizenship terminology glossary.5 
 
International law scholarship generally refers to ‘nationality’, with its roots in 
(nation)-state-building, when referring to the legal status of individuals as 
recognised across the global system of states. But that term is also frequently used 
to denote a set of concepts more closely linked to ideas of the nation, of ethnicity 
and of common cultural affinities via language, territory and history. There were, 
for example, ‘nationalities’ recognised within the Austro-Hungarian empire, and 
these have been in some cases the forerunners of the citizenships of states which 
have emerged from that empire (e.g. Slovak or Slovenian). In other cases, these 
nationalities remain stateless ‘national identities’, which cut across the boundaries 
of modern nation states or correspond to modern ‘regions’ such as Galicia or 
Transylvania. Citizenship, with its connotations of shared rule and civic purpose, is 
the term more frequently used when discussing the full range of (civic, political 
and social) membership rights, duties and commonalities articulated and/or 
protected under a national constitution and its associated institutions. Despite 
these distinctions, the capacity for confusion is legion, including in circumstances 
                                                        
3  For a legal approach see G.-R de Groot, ‘Nationality Law’, in J. Smits (ed.) Elgar Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2nd Ed. 2012, 600-619. 
4  M. Vink, R. Bauböck and J. Shaw, ‘A short history of comparative research on citizenship’, in 
O. Vonk (ed.), Grootboek: Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof.mr. Gerard-René de Groot ter 
gelegenheid van zijn afscheid als hoogleraar rechtsvergelijking en internationaal 
privaatrecht aan de Universiteit Maastricht, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 
409-422.  
5  For details see the EUDO Citizenship glossary and terminology section: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary/terminology. 
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which matter, such as the recently introduced requirement in the UK criminal 
courts that the defendant state his or her ‘nationality’.6 
 
3. The state and ‘beyond the state’: intersections of citizenship and 
constitutional law 
In this collection, much emphasis is placed on what states do, how they do it, why 
they do, and how the actions of states can be justified against norms of justice, 
equality and legitimacy. But citizenship is not just something that is ‘given’ by 
states. Both the scope and extent of citizenship as a status as well as citizenship 
rights and duties are frequently contested within and across states by citizens’ and 
non-citizens’ ‘citizenship practices’. International law, alongside constitutional law 
and other fields of domestic law, also plays an important role7 and René de Groot 
has gone so far as to argue that there exists a European nationality law, at least in 
the making.8 In today’s world, citizenship is best understood not in unitary terms 
but as a set of relationships nested within multilevel and plural sources of legal 
authority. Accordingly, looking beyond the hegemony of the state, these collected 
essays also offer an insight into what Melissa Williams has termed the ‘citizenships 
of globalization’.9 
 
Under that broad heading, we will look into the many different challenges that 
national citizenship models and regimes face from above, from below and from the 
side (i.e. supranational, subnational and transnational citizenship issues). Various 
non-state entities, such as the European Union or polities not (fully) recognised 
under international law, have each purported to confer a status termed ‘citizenship’ 
on individuals, sometimes in competition with and other times in collaboration 
with existing states. Is it right and proper to call these statuses ‘citizenships’? A 
variety of different social and geopolitical phenomena, including increased 
international mobility, the creation of new states pursuant to decolonialization, as 
well as the break up of a number of (federal) states, have each contributed to 
increased ‘demand’ for dual nationality. There have been widespread concessions 
on this point across state practice, at least in Europe and North America, although 
the manner and extent to which dual citizenship is permitted for different 
categories (those acquiring it by birth, immigrants, and emigrants) vary greatly.10 
Data collected by Maastricht University for the case of naturalisations indicate that 
around 75% of countries in the world allow dual citizenship for some groups, and 
only 25% have provisions restricting either immigrants or emigrants retaining or 
                                                        
6  For a short note on this measure, which is part of the so-called ‘hostile environment’ 
intended to deter illegal immigration, but which could have serious and unforeseen 
consequences for defendants who literally do not know which ‘citizenship/s’ or 
‘nationalit/ies’ they have or do not understand the question in so far as it creates a new 
criminal offence, see: C. Yeo, ‘The “hostile environment” seeps into criminal trials: 
defendants must state nationality or face prison’, 17 November 2017,  
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/defendants-nationality-criminal-trials/.  
7  P. Spiro, ‘A New International Law of Citizenship’, (2011) 105 American Journal of 
International Law 694-746. 
8  G.-R. de Groot, ‘Towards a European nationality law’, (2004) 8 Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, no.3 (October). 
9  M. Williams, ‘Non-territorial boundaries of citizenship’, in S. Benhabib et al (eds), Identities, 
Allegiances, Affiliations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 226-256. 
10  For an up to date review see P. Spiro, ‘Multiple Citizenship’, in A. Shachar et al (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, Oxford: OUP, 2017, 623-643. 
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gaining a second nationality.11 This trend towards dual citizenship in turn creates 
additional pressures for those states that are still ‘hold outs’ on this point, although 
there remain parts of the world, especially on the African and Asian continents, 
where dual citizenship is more an exception than the general norm. Even where 
dual citizenship is not an option (e.g. India) a form of external citizenship has been 
created to foster relations with the diaspora. Within states, regions – whether or 
not pressing for secession – often seek greater powers and autonomy in relation to 
aspects of citizenship. This is confined, most often, to the sphere of social 
citizenship, but some (con)federal regions have considerable powers in relation to 
immigration (e.g. Québec) or, as in Switzerland, jealously guard their competences 
relating to citizenship acquisition through naturalisation against encroachment by 
the federal legislator. In sum, we see with citizenship a clear case of fragmented 
governance,12 and the splintering of what was generally thought, after the rise of 
the Westphalian state, to be a sphere of exclusive national competence. 
 
Yet despite all of these actual and potential challenges to the state, the starting 
point for our discussion must still be the state, as recognised in international law. 
It has become a standard tenet of international law, in relation to what it terms 
‘nationality’, that it is for each state – according to its sole discretion – to determine 
issues of legal membership within that state.13 Of course, there are legal and 
practical constraints on what states may do in relation to the distribution of 
citizenship (especially stemming from international law and from the laws of other 
states). Chief amongst these is perhaps the ‘right to a nationality’ and the right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of his (sic) nationality, contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, although that provision does not decree which state 
must confer nationality.14 This provision, like various instruments on 
statelessness,15 is intended merely to be a guarantee of the basic ‘right to have 
rights’ famously articulated by Hannah Arendt.16 It is widely assumed amongst 
scholars that the international right to citizenship exists to mitigate the harms 
caused by statelessness.17 But the basic principle still holds true as a starting point. 
It is states that confer citizenship on individuals, as a basic sorting principle, and it 
is states that are required to recognise the citizenship status conferred by other 
states, subject to what has been termed the ‘genuine link’ principle articulated by 
the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case.18 Even in relation to the 
world’s most developed form of supranational citizenship – that of the European 
Union – it is national citizenship that provides the exclusive access point to being a 
Citizen of the Union. 
                                                        
11  Personal communication from Professor Maarten Vink, on file with author, 19 November 
2017; full data is available at https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/dual-cit-database/.  
12  J. Trachtman, ‘Fragmentation of Citizenship Governance’, A. Shachar et al, above n.10, 599-
620. 
13  See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (The 
Hague, 1930). 
14  Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
15  See the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness. 
16  H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, London: Andre Deutsch, 1986 at 291. 
17  M. Gibney, ‘Should Citizenship Be Conditional? The Ethics of Denationalization’ (2013) 75 
The Journal of Politics 646–58. 
18  Liechtenstein v. Guatemala [1955] ICJ 1. 
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When exploring how states regulate citizenship from the perspective of national 
law, it is logical to begin with the national constitution, whether this comprises a 
single document, or multiple documents and associated principles. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines constitution as ‘A body of fundamental principles or 
established precedents according to which a state or other organization is 
acknowledged to be governed.’ What is missing from this definition is any sense of 
agency: Who brought this constitution into being? Who is acknowledging the 
authority and legitimacy of the constitutional framework? Who is governing and 
who is being governed? Constitutions can make citizens; but citizens also make 
constitutions. Accordingly, this is where the intersection of concepts of citizenship, 
democracy and constituent power come into play, at least as regards the 
constitutional frameworks of states aspiring to democratic credentials. Once we go 
beyond the idea of citizenship as a simple sorting principle and formal legal status, 
and recognise that citizenship encapsulates also expressions of political autonomy 
and community identity, we can discern that the relationship between citizenship 
and constitutional law is likely to be a complex and iterative one. 
 
From the starting point of comparative constitutional law, Rubenstein and Lenagh 
Maguire suggest that  
 
Citizenship is a prime site for comparisons between different constitutional 
systems, for the idea of citizenship, and the ideals it is taken to represent, go 
to the heart of how states are constituted and defined.19 
 
Modern constitutions and modern citizenship share a great deal of history in 
common; the central political power (i.e. historically the absolute monarch) has 
been placed under the authority of common institutions at broadly the same point 
in history as the human subject has emerged as a distinctive and sovereign 
political agent. This agent, now ‘the citizen’, owes more than a personal 
relationship of allegiance to the sovereign (i.e. as ‘subject’), but rather is embedded 
in a network of reciprocal vertical and horizontal relationships.20 That is not to say 
that it is impossible to trace citizenship back further than the French or American 
revolutions or indeed the Peace of Westphalia. Indeed, most comprehensive 
histories of citizenship will start in Greek and/or Roman times and also identify 
other important developments in the city states of the middle ages.21 But the 
distinctive concept of modern liberal and democratic citizenship in the 
Westphalian state tradition is a more recent innovation, albeit one that draws 
quite substantially on its origins in city-scale membership models. The modern 
model relies heavily on a distinctive shift towards universalist thinking that owes 
much to the European enlightenment, even though citizenship status and 
citizenship rights in most present day nation states were not remotely universally 
                                                        
19  K. Rubenstein and N. Lenagh-Maguire, ‘Citizenship and the boundaries of the constitution’, 
in T. Ginsburg and R. Dixon (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham, 2011, 143-169 at 143. 
20  See S. Seubert, ‘Dynamics of Modern Citizenship Democracy and Peopleness in a Global Era’, 
(2014) 21 Constellations 547–559 at 548. 
21  See R. Balot, ‘Revisiting the Classical Ideal of Citizenship’, in Shachar et al, above n.10, 17-
35 and P. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992. 
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allocated at least until the 20th century. Even in the face of challenges of 
globalization in the neo-liberal world, the model of national citizenship is 
remaining remarkably resilient, adjusting to allow space for new models of affinity 
and legal belonging, without fading away.22 
 
One element that modern constitutionalism and modern citizenship share in 
common is that they attach importance to narratives of belonging, identity and 
loyalty as well as to the importance of shared rule by law and under the law. Small 
changes can make a considerable difference to core narratives as the case of 
Hungary shows. It was the only central and Eastern European state not to adopt a 
new constitution after the end of the cold war in 1989. In fact, the adoption of a 
formal constitution for Hungary was delayed until 2011. It was a highly politicised 
and controversial process when it happened, as the text sought to address not only 
negative dimensions of the communist era, but also Hungary’s perceived unjust 
treatment in relation to boundaries under the Treaty of Trianon after the First 
World War. The name of the state was changed from the Republic of Hungary to 
‘Hungary’, and the preamble refers to ‘the Hungarian Nation’, reinforcing links with 
diaspora / external Hungarians (and their descendants) in neighbouring states, 
who have been given increased access to Hungarian citizenship on a ‘restitutionary’ 
ethnic basis in recent years, as well as the right to participate in national 
elections.23  
 
However, just as there are no two identical constitutions, so there are no two 
identical ways in which constitutions deal with the issue of citizenship. That much 
will be evident from case studies of national citizenship regimes presented in Part 
III. 
 
4. The nature and implications of ‘constitutional’ citizenship 
Rubenstein and Lenagh Maguire use four comparator states: Australia, Canada, the 
United States of America and Israel. Across these states, they discern such 
complexity and diversity of approach that even a broad thematic summary that 
distinguishes between ‘constitutional’, ‘quasi-constitutional’ and ‘statutory’ 
approaches to the legal structuring of citizenship regimes is hard to sustain. 
 
Some constitutions mention citizenship, others do not; yet others focus instead on 
the amorphous concept of ‘the people’, who may, or may not, be identical to the 
citizenry. Many constitutions highlight only ‘the alien’, citizenship’s ‘other’ and not 
the citizen herself. In fact, the GlobalCIT data on citizenship laws demonstrate that 
Latin America is somewhat of an outlier compared to other continents as regards 
constitutional engagement with the terms of citizenship, especially conferment of 
citizenship by birth in the territory (ius soli).24 
 
In many cases, constitutional frameworks are limited to conferring statutory 
authority on the legislature to regulate the scope and character of citizenship; of 
course, when this is the case, it is notable how much power is placed in the hands 
                                                        
22  B. Hindess, ‘Neo-liberal Citizenship’, (2002) 6 Citizenship Studies 127-143. 
23  S. Pogonyi, Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
24  See generally http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles.  
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of the ordinary legislator to of determine the scope of the citizenry. That is, 
fundamental changes to citizenship law are not subject to super-majorities. On the 
other hand, constitutional definitions of citizenship may sometimes be too hard to 
amend. Yet when Ireland, for example, needed a referendum in 2004 to change the 
definition of ius soli, and to restrict access to citizenship for children born in the 
territory only to those whose parents were either citizens or settled migrants, the 
government of the day had no difficulty garnering the necessary majority. In the 
case of federal constitutions, this will require also the articulation of any split in 
relation to competences between the federal and the state levels. Such authority 
may well be limited: constitutions often place restrictions on what a federal 
legislature may do in relation to the scope of citizenship, leaving other matters to 
be regulated by the states. 
 
When it comes to citizens’ rights and duties, some constitutional frameworks are 
not specific, but refer mainly to human rights or to constitutional rights, which may 
extend beyond the class of resident citizens, in terms of coverage. Many such rights 
also protect non-citizens who are lawfully resident on the territory or even to 
anyone present on the territory, for whatever reason. Some rights have 
extraterritorial reach, as well as extended personal scope. It is insufficient, 
moreover, to discuss the role of rights in the constitution of citizenship without 
reference to the role of international law. International human rights and 
humanitarian laws are particularly important for the protection of those within 
states who are not citizens, especially those who are stateless or are otherwise in 
need of protection, e.g. refugees and asylum seekers.25 
 
Scholars and political commentators often have a hard time articulating what 
rights in modern states are genuinely restricted to citizens alone. To put it another 
way, they have trouble isolating the essence of the internal as opposed to the 
international right to citizenship.26 This is one domain where the line between 
citizen and alien has become blurred. This may be why some scholarship has 
focused instead on the ‘hallmarks’ of citizenship, rather than the rights.27 Probably 
the unconditional right to return is one of the few rights given exclusively to 
citizens, although patterns and processes of denationalization28 and deportation29 
have made even that story much more complex in recent years. Voting rights tend 
to prioritize citizens, especially in relation to national elections, but even in that 
field there are many cases of resident non-citizens being permitted to vote 
especially in local elections.30 But, conversely, many more states now permit 
                                                        
25  See A. Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
26  For the use of this distinction see P. Lenard, ‘Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization’, 
American Political Science Review, online first, doi:10.1017/S0003055417000442, 2017. 
27  Gardner, J. P. (ed.), Citizenship: The White Paper, London: Institute for Citizenship 
Studies/The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1997. 
28  M. Gibney, ‘Denationalization’, in A. Shachar et al above n.10, 360-382. 
29  K. Rubenstein and N. Lenagh-Maguire, ‘More or Less Secure? Nationality Questions, 
Deportation and Dual Nationality’ in A. Edwards and L. Van Waas (eds.), Nationality and 
Statelessness under International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 264–
291. 
30  See J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship and the Franchise’, in A. Shachar et al above n.10, 290-312. 
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external voting by non-resident citizens.31 This phenomenon emphasizes the 
loosening of the territorial link between citizen and state. Along with the rise of 
dual citizenship, the spread of external voting could be said to be the second ‘new 
norm’ of citizenship from the later decades of the 20th century onwards. 
 
One of the key questions, when seeking to understand any given citizenship regime, 
concerns the role of institutions. Reference has already been made to the 
legislature. In the domain of citizenship, as with immigration, executives often 
have a crucial role to play in the policing the boundaries of membership, e.g. 
through discretionary naturalization decisions, decisions on access to the asylum 
system or deportation processes. Executives also frequently make use of private 
businesses, e.g. in areas like citizenship testing. Unsurprisingly, there is an 
important role for judicial institutions, not least in the oversight of executive 
decision-making, whether taken directly by the administration or ‘delegated’ to 
private business. What are the roles of constitutional courts and/or the ordinary 
courts when adjudicating upon the scope of citizens’ rights or the processes for 
granting or denying membership? How have courts resolved any possible tensions 
between international human rights obligations prioritizing the protection of all as 
against the domestic prioritization of the interests of the ‘constitutional people’? 
 
5. Constitutional citizenship in practice: the case of Australia 
The case of Australian citizenship illustrates many of the points made in the 
previous section about the interface of citizenship and constitutional law very 
neatly.32 Australia represents a good example of a country with a constitution that 
acts more as a constrainer rather than an enabler in relation to citizenship matters. 
 
The Australian constitution emerged out of Australia’s gradual process of 
independence, its loosening of relationships with the British Empire and the 
United Kingdom and its federalisation process. The constitution predates the 
creation of Australian citizenship as a freestanding status under national law, and 
in fact the formal legal status of ‘Australians’ until 1948 and the passage of the first 
citizenship legislation was that of ‘British subjects’. The constitution does not 
define or directly regulate citizenship, but it provides a power for the federal 
parliament to regulate the status of aliens and mandates that elected 
representatives in the federal parliament should owe no allegiance to a foreign 
power. Between 1948 and 1987, Australians had the dual status of British subjects 
and Australian citizens. Despite this duality, the new state had a rather restrictive 
approach to dual citizenship, as the space for a distinctive Australian citizenship 
was carved out in the postwar period. Modernisation processes have seen an 
increased toleration of dual citizenship, both for Australians acquiring another 
citizenship, who no longer lost their Australian citizenship (after 2002) and also 
for ‘new Australians’, who no longer had to renounce a previous nationality (after 
1949). 
 
                                                        
31  See M. Collyer, ‘A geography of extra-territorial citizenship: Explanations of external 
voting’, (2014) 2 Migration Studies 55-72. 
32  See generally K. Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law, Sydney: Lawbook Company of 
Australia/Thomson Reuters, 2017 (2nd edition); R. Thwaites, Report on Citizenship Law: 
Australia, RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-CR 2017/11. 
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However, recent controversies relating to the application of the constitutional 
prohibition on elected representatives at federal level holding dual citizenship, 
have culminated with the fates of seven politicians being decided by the High Court 
and many others becoming embroiled in the controversy. This case has 
demonstrated that these modernisation processes have hit their limits when it 
comes to the interface between democratic inclusion and the requirement of 
exclusive allegiance to Australia.33 The High Court judgment in Re Canavan 
confirms the stringent requirements of s44(ii) of the Australian constitution, 
applying a strict test whereby it was not necessary for a person to know about 
their second citizenship status for them to fall foul of the constitutional 
restriction.34 Only cases where renunciation is impossible will be permitted. Yet 
this strict approach somehow places Australia outside the mainstream of liberal 
democracies in relation to the application of bars on parliamentarians holding dual 
citizenship (and indeed, less strict arrangements are applicable in some Australian 
states) and for many observers is an excessive restriction.35 In a country such as 
Australia, where a high proportion, probably more than half, of all citizens, their 
parents or grandparents have been born outside the country,36 it may indeed be 
hard to say what citizenships may have been ‘accidentally’ or unknowingly 
conferred by descent, or where – because of legislative measures adopted in 
another country – citizenship has been reconferred on a descendant on an 
automatic basis. Where citizenship is not known about, it cannot so easily be 
renounced. Moreover, this restriction is constitutionally enshrined and not 
amenable to simple amendment. An opportunity was missed in 1997, when a 
parliamentary committee recommended changing the constitution to put the 
disqualification provisions into legislation, which would then be amenable to 
change, only keeping a constitutional requirement that representatives be 
Australian citizens. 
 
Now that the issue has become salient again, the dual citizenship restriction has 
become a tool amongst political parties seeking to gain advantages inside and 
outside parliament, it has reduced the perceived legitimacy of elected 
parliamentary representatives amongst voters, and it threatens to create a 
precautionary approach in which large swathes of Australia’s multicultural 
population are effectively excluded from federal election.37 And yet, as a proposed 
amendment to the Australian constitution (there have been only eight since its 
inception), the removal of the strict ban on dual citizen federal representatives 
                                                        
33  See G. Orr, ‘Dual Citizen MPs in Australia’s National Parliament – the Barriers Bite’, EUDO 
Citizenship Blog, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-blog/1884-dual-
citizen-mps-in-australia-s-national-parliament-the-barriers-bite; E. Arcioni and H. Irving, 
‘Form over substance? Foreign citizenship and the Australian Parliament’, EUDO 
Citizenship Blog, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-blog/1929-form-
over-substance-foreign-citizenship-and-the-australian-parliament.  
34  In re Canavan [2017] HCA 45. 
35  D. de Groot, ‘(Dual National) Politicians – between “Pure-Bloods” and “Half-Bloods”’, NCCR 
on the move blog, 14 November 2017, http://blog.nccr-onthemove.ch/dual-national-
politicians-between-pure-bloods-and-half-bloods/.  
36  See data at http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/lookup/Media%20Release3.  
37  For critical comment and a call for constitutional amendment see J. McIntyre, ‘The dual 
citizenship saga shows our Constitution must be changed, and now’, The Conversation, 16 
November 2017, https://theconversation.com/the-dual-citizenship-saga-shows-our-
constitution-must-be-changed-and-now-87330.  
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lacks the political salience and intellectual ‘colour’ of the other main constitutional 
issue actively under consideration, namely the recognition as part of ‘the people’ of 
Australia of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.38 
 
But this is not the only example of Australian constitutional principles, in the 
hands of the courts, casting a shadow in such a way as to nuance the meaning of 
citizenship. After the independence of the formerly Australian-administered 
territory of Papua New Guinea, the Australian High Court held that although 
Papuans had previously been statutory Australian citizens, in practice they had a 
constitutionally inferior form of Australian citizenship which did not confer upon 
them membership of the ‘constitutional people’. According to the High Court, it 
was thus permissible to deny them entry to Australia. A whole category of 
Australian citizens was thereby effectively expatriated by a reading of the 
constitution in conjunction with measures taken under international law (i.e. the 
independence of PNG and the creation of its citizenship regime).39 On the other 
side of the coin, the constitutional distinction between citizens and aliens (the 
latter having no privileges) has produced some astonishing consequences. The 
majority of the High Court in Al-Kateb v. Godwin40 interpreted immigration 
legislation to the effect that it was not unlawful for the state indefinitely to detain 
stateless persons who had no lawful cause to be in Australia (e.g. an asylum claim 
had been refused), even where there was no reasonable prospect of removal (i.e. 
no other state would take them and they could not return to where they had come 
from). Such detention could, logically, last the entirety of a person’s lifetime, with 
no constitutional restriction on this problematic and damaging treatment of 
aliens.41 
 
6. The sovereignty of citizenship 
Many scholars have remarked that modern citizenship is a less conditional and 
more sovereign status for individuals when compared both to concepts of 
subjecthood, as elaborated under the common law in England,42 or to legal 
concepts of citizenship as developed and applied in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Following significant misuse of denationalization capacities in the 
interwar years by a number of totalitarian regimes, however, the commitment to 
the right to a nationality in international human rights instruments after the 
second world war seems to have heralded a new dawn. On that account, 
citizenship is not a privilege, but a right. Invoking US case law, such as Afroyim v. 
                                                        
38  E. Arcioni, ‘Tracing the ethno-cultural or racial identity of the Australian constitutional 
people’, (2015) 15 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 173-195. 
39  See Ex Parte Ame (2005) 222 CLR 439, and for commentary K. Rubenstein with J. Field, 
‘What is a “real” Australian citizen? Insights from Papua New Guinea and Mr. Amos Ame’, in 
B. Lawrance and J. Stevens (eds.), Citizenship in Question. Evidentiary Birthright and 
Statelessness, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2017. 
40  (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
41  H. Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home: The Constitution and the Citizen’s Right of Abode’, 
(2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 133-153. 
42  The ius soli principle can be traced back to Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng Rep 377 (KB, 1608). 
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Rusk,43 Ayelet Shachar has referred to the ‘constitutional right to remain a 
citizen’.44 Yet continued practices of denationalization seem to challenge that view. 
 
For example, Australia is one of a number of states that have introduced new 
citizenship stripping provisions, including ones aimed at native born citizens who 
have a second nationality, which are said to be a response to the ‘war on terror’, 
allowing the state to widen the raft of measures available to restrict the threat 
from those deemed to be harmful for the state and its citizens.45 Denationalization 
is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, it was common even in what we would now 
describe as the ‘western democracies’, partly as a result of wars and other conflicts 
(creating categories of enemy aliens and making naturalised citizens from enemy 
states inherently ‘suspect’) and partly because of a focus on the singularity of 
citizenship.46 This latter focus led to resistance to dual citizenship (so that 
acquisition of one citizenship generally required the renouncing or loss of the 
previous citizenship) and a widespread insistence on the idea of a single 
nationality for a family (which in turn led to many women in transnational 
marriages losing their citizenship).47 The reprise of citizenship stripping in the 21st 
century has, however, a different optic. Many have compared it more to medieval 
practices of banishment than to 19th and 20th century denationalization, but 
returning this time as an administrative practice subject to limited judicial review, 
rather than an element of formal punishment imposed within criminal process.48 
In part, this is because the UK – which has been the leader in putting citizenship 
stripping into practice (as opposed to discussing such provisions in parliament 
without formal adoption (as in France) or instituting new provisions which have 
barely been used (as in Austria)) – has adopted the practice of stripping the UK 
citizenship of those suspected of terrorist offences or certain types of terrorist or 
jihadist involvement when they are outside the UK. This means that they can be 
refused re-entry as non-nationals and must contest any measures taken against 
them from outside the territory. Even so, there are still cases where citizenship has 
retained its constitutional sovereignty, notably the United States where the 
Supreme Court has continued along the pathway of recognising citizenship as an 
absolute status that cannot be lost without consent, as a necessary corollary of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the historical denial of citizenship to slaves. For Weil, 
this is an important dimension of the republican tradition that enables the rollback 
of racially tainted historical narratives and resists pressure to water down the 
resulting outcomes, which currently protect the sovereignty of the citizen.49 
 
But as Bauböck and Paskalev point out, in mapping the terrain of loss of citizenship 
from the perspective of normative theory, there remain many other state practices 
                                                        
43  Afroyim v. Rusk 387 US 253 (1967). 
44  A Shachar, ‘Citizenship’, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 1003-1019 at 1012. 
45  L. Zedner, ‘Citizenship Deprivation, Security and Human Rights’, (2016) 18 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 222–242. 
46  See Gibney above n.28. 
47  H. Irving, Citizenship, Alienage, and the Modern Constitutional State: A Gendered History, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
48  Gibney above n.28. 
49  P. Weil, The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalization and the Origins of the American Republic, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
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beyond the sphere of public security and public safety under which the majority of 
states justify the involuntary removal of citizenship, including in cases where those 
losing citizenship have no other nationality to fall back on, such as cases of 
fraudulent acquisition.50 There are few states that adopt the position of 
constitutional sovereignty for citizens, which currently holds sway in the United 
States of America. 
 
7. Citizenship and constitutional law: a sketch of the collection 
Having set out some key aspects of interface between citizenship and 
constitutional law, we can now conclude this introduction by returning to the 
selection and organisation of articles. Space – and the highly dispersed nature of 
the topics covered – precludes me offering more than brief notes on the topics 
covered in each of the five Parts. It is not possible, for example, to provide an 
abstract for each individual chapter, or to show how these chapters might be 
linked together with some type of golden thread or single argument. As we have 
already shown, the citizenship / constitutional law interface is multi-facetted and 
not amenable to simple linear abstraction. 
 
Part I digs into the fundamentals of the relationship between citizenship as a 
constitutional ideal and democratic constitutionalism, addressing both the theory 
and the practice. These essays help us to understand how constitutionalism and 
constitutional law can add to the meaning, the heft,51 of citizenship, by ensuring 
that it is seen as a core status which is more then, for example, a club membership. 
For example, as Jean Cohen points out, restraining popular sovereignty through 
constitutionalism helps to reconcile the different elements of the citizenship 
principle.52 For sure, this leaves some open questions as to the relationship 
between citizenship and constitutional change in an authoritarian direction, as has 
been seen in Poland and Hungary in recent years – that is, even within EU Member 
States. 
 
The essays in this part interrogate core questions, such as the relationship 
between constituent power, constitutional notions of ‘the people’, allegiance to the 
state and citizenship itself. As the ‘scales’ of the constitutional lenses may differ 
from time to time, and place to place, different aspects of citizenship come into 
view. Increasingly pluralistic societies, including those embedded in complex 
multilevel governance arrangements, constantly strive to identify and ‘fix’ the glue 
that holds them together. Further, as Tully’s essay shows,53 citizenship is not just a 
constitutional ‘given’. Rather, as with constitutions, there exist a multiplicity of 
citizenships across the axes of the civil/cosmopolitan and the civic/glocal. As the 
example of constitutional changes to the meaning of the state and of the ‘people’ in 
Hungary shows, the direction of travel may vary – towards more ‘ethnic’ and 
                                                        
50  R. Bauböck and V. Paskalev, ‘Cutting genuine links : a normative analysis of citizenship 
deprivation’, (2015) 30 Georgetown immigration law journal 47-104. 
51  A. Macklin, ‘Who Is the Citizen’s Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship’, (2007) 8 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 333-366. 
52  J. Cohen, ‘Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos’, (1999) 
14 International Sociology 245-268. 
53  James Tully (2008), ‘Two Meanings of Global Citizenship: Modern and Diverse’, In:  Michael 
A. Peters, Harry Blee & Alan Britton (eds.), Global Citizenship Education: Philosophy, Theory 
and Pedagogy, Rotterdam: Sense Publication, 15-39.  
 13 
‘thicker’ descriptions of peoplehood, as well as towards thinner cosmopolitan or 
institutionally bounded conceptions. 
 
Parts II and III together review the national, international and transnational trends 
in relation to acquisition and loss of citizenship. Along the way, the texts highlight 
some of the controls that constitutions (along with international law) may place on 
citizenship policy-making, e.g. in relation to gender equality requirements. As the 
essays show, the classic modes of acquisition at birth, namely ius soli (territory) 
and ius sanguinis (parentage) can be both complementary and in tension to each 
other. Of course, in few if any cases do states settle the details of either birthright 
or – in particular – citizenship acquisition after birth settled in the form of 
constitutional provisions. However, as the essays in both parts show, there are 
obvious interactions between the more abstract political conceptions of 
peopleness often articulated explicitly or implicitly in constitutional texts or 
constitutional interpretations and the detailed foundation stones of citizenship 
acquisition. This is particularly clear if we encompass in the assessment other 
forms of attachment given legal recognition in citizenship laws such as ius nexi (i.e. 
the imperative to give recognition to persons who have a close attachment to a 
particular state whether through residence or ethnic belonging), ius tempus (i.e. 
the recognition that citizenship is an attachment in space and time) and even ius 
pecuniae (where states recognise particular financial contributions that individuals 
have made and award them citizenship in recompense). Of course, investor 
citizenship (perhaps the purest form of ius pecuniae) is not the only way in which 
states ‘compete’ for valuable citizens. There is now a whole body of commodified 
modes of ‘Olympic citizenship’, which range from preferential visa access (‘the 
brightest and the best’) to conferment of citizenship on those liable to offer athletic 
prowess to a state.54 That citizenship practices have economic and cultural 
dimensions, especially when it comes to practices of naturalisation, is plain from 
the examples of state practice examined. 
 
But citizenship regimes do not exist in isolation, and it is important to see also the 
‘constellations’ that arise out of different types of transnational engagement, as 
well as supranational commitments on the part of states. Indeed the importance of 
looking beyond state practice and reflecting also on the structuring effects of 
international law is an explicit topic of some of the essays, and implicit in many 
others. States regulate, but international law, including private international law, is 
highly relevant to thinking about these issues, not least through the backstop 
provided by its injunction on states to avoid statelessness. Furthermore, this is 
very much not just a ‘constitutional’ question. When it comes to citizenship as 
‘living together’, it is clear, for example from the work of René de Groot, that the 
‘toolbox’ must contains materials drawn from all fields of law, including civil law, 
family law and inheritance law.55  
 
                                                        
54  A. Shachar, ‘Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent’, (2011) 
120 Yale Law Journal 2088-2139. 
55  G.-R. de Groot, Towards a toolbox for nationality legislation, Text of the Valedictory Lecture 
as Professor of Comparative Law and Private International Law at Maastricht University 
delivered on 14 October 2016. 
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Part III develops many of these ideas in the context of national case studies focused 
on the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Croatia and Israel. 
Although offering considerable variety of approach, these case studies do not, 
unfortunately, do much to help us counter a historic Eurocentric bias in much 
scholarship regarding citizenship.56 But it is in North America and Western Europe 
that the bulk of studies have been carried out hitherto, although this is gradually 
changing,57 in ways that has often disturbed taken for granted assumptions about 
what constitutes a ‘liberal’ citizenship regime.58 
 
The ‘citizenships of globalization’ are the focus in Part IV of the collection. 
Citizenship scholars generally share the view that citizenship can no longer be 
conceived as operating solely by reference to (singular) national domain. 
Citizenship, although still dominated by the national regulator and national 
frameworks such as citizenship laws and constitutional provisions, now has a 
strong transnational dimension, with greater tolerance of dual nationality and an 
emerging norm allowing non-resident citizens to vote in national elections. Where 
authors differ, however, is in relation to their understanding of the intensity and 
significance of these changes. It is, however, no coincidence that the revival of 
interest in citizenship as a status and in developing theories of citizenship 
coincided in time with the creation of what has been called ‘the world’s first 
example of fully institutionalised trans, or post-national political rights going 
beyond the nation state’,59 that of the European Union, by virtue of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993. Yet, as the case of the UK’s decision 
to leave the European Union and thus to unravel the implications of EU citizenship 
has shown, centrifugal as well as centripetal forces can come into play in the 
fragmented governance of citizenship. 
 
The final part of the collection moves to the terrain of the rights and duties of 
citizens, and struggles to achieve these. In Part V, the collected essays highlight the 
ambiguous role of the state and of state institutions, which have sometimes 
facilitated the enhancement and spread of citizenship rights, and sometimes 
resisted this. Although the leitmotiv of modern citizenship is equality, as struggles 
for citizenship rights have shown, it took many decades, for example, for the 
struggle for female suffrage to achieve anything like equality for women. Much 
legal scholarship on citizenship rights has placed the status non-citizen at the 
centre of the enquiry, rather than regarding the non-citizen merely as ‘the other’, 
defined by reference only to the citizen. Constitutional equality principles, such as 
those in the Canadian Charter of Rights, may retain untapped potential for those 
struggling to ensure that universal citizenship is just that, universal in effect as 
well as in letter. The case of Zunera Ishaq and her successful challenge to be 
allowed to take her Canadian citizenship oath whilst wearing the niqab illustrates 
the potentiality of the Charter, although the case was decided on a point of 
                                                        
56  E. Chung, ‘Citizenship in Non-Western Contexts’, in A. Shachar et al above n.10. 
57  For a compendium of material including country reports on a wide range of states beyond 
Europe and North America, see the GlobalCit website: http://globalcit.eu/.  
58  See also Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín Culling the Masses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2014. 
59  A. Favell, ‘European identity and European citizenship in three “Eurocities”: a sociological 
approach to the European Union’, (2010) 30 Politique Européenne 187-224 at 187. 
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administrative law not using the Charter.60 But at the same time that such points 
are successfully litigated, in the name of constitutional resources, states continue 
to construct increasingly hard borders around the edges of the citizenship status 
using immigration law and criminal law in the name of principles such as public 
order and public security. For one of the most important aspects of this body of 
scholarship concerns the relationship between constitutional law, on the one hand, 
and other aspects of the legal order, especially immigration law and criminal law, 
on the other. In sum, it is clear that ‘full citizenship’ is not a stable end state, but 
rather a continuously reinstituted process, involving struggles and contestations, 
as scholars such as Somers have shown us. 
 
It is useful, in conclusion, to return to a point made by Tully, namely that there is 
no single universal ‘language of citizenship’, but rather a multiplicity. Constitutions, 
as well as citizenships, are a ‘strange multiplicity’.61 It is thus the deception of 
‘modern citizenship’ that it masquerades as universal, thereby concealing from 
view other plausible ways of being and relating to each other.62 As Part V shows us, 
the blending of – and where necessary the distinction between – practice and 
status is thus crucial to understanding the complex interrelationships between 
citizenship and constitutional law. 
 
                                                        
60  See Ishaq v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2015 FC 156. For 
commentary see A. Macklin, ‘From Settler Society to Warrior Nation and Back Again’, in J. 
Mann (ed.), Citizenship in Transnational Perspective, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
61  J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
62  See Seubert, above n.20. 
